

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.604
29 August 1991

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE SIX HUNDRED AND FOURTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 29 August 1991, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Horacio Arteaga (Venezuela)

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): The 604th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is now called to order.

I am particularly pleased to welcome warmly, on behalf of the Conference and on my own behalf, the new representative of Brazil, Ambassador Celso Luiz Nunes Amorim, a diplomat with an outstanding professional career who has just joined us. In so doing, Sir, I would like to stress the close and cordial links uniting our two countries, a model of good-neighbourliness, and the personal commitment as well as the commitment of my delegation to cooperate with you within the context of the activities of the Conference. I am certain that Ambassador Nunes Amorim will make a most useful contribution to the work we are doing here. So welcome, Mr. Ambassador.

As I announced at our last plenary meeting, I will put before the Conference for decision today, once we have concluded the list of speakers, the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-nuclear-weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, contained in document CD/1104. As agreed in the timetable of meetings for this week, the Conference will hold an informal meeting immediately following the plenary meeting to consider the technical parts of the report to the United Nations General Assembly, which have been circulated in documents CD/WP.409 and 411.

On the list of speakers for today I have the representatives of Italy, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, India, who will do so to introduce the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban, Argentina, on behalf of the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, and the Republic of Korea. I now call on the first speaker for today, the representative of Italy, Ambassador Negrotto Cambiaso.

Mr. NEGROTTO CAMBIASO (Italy): Mr. President, at the outset, allow me to express to you my most sincere congratulations and satisfaction at seeing you, the distinguished representative of Venezuela, a country with which Italy shares ancient and fraternal ties, presiding over our work. I am sure that under your capable guidance the Conference on Disarmament will be able to conclude successfully its activities for the 1991 session. I would also like to avail myself of this opportunity to express my appreciation to your distinguished predecessor, Ambassador Stephen Ledogar, for the skilful manner in which he presided over the Conference in the previous month; and in the meanwhile welcome all the new permanent representatives and colleagues who have joined us since the Italian delegation last took the floor in the CD plenary.

Before the annual session of the Conference on Disarmament draws to a close, I would like to summarize some of the views of my country regarding the negotiations which have been taking up so much of our time and efforts this year, and which we sincerely hope are now approaching the much longed-for conclusion. The events we have jointly witnessed would have provided us, in times less "interesting" than the current ones, with enough substance to fill up a timespan of various decades, rather than simply a few months. And, since in this final stretch of the millennium, days are unwinding as if each one of

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them contained events of a whole year, it is wise not to lose sight of day-by-day realities, paying the utmost attention to all those unrepeatable opportunities occurring almost daily.

The new impetus to the chemical weapons negotiations is the result of a tragic event, as a war always is, from which an innumerable set of lessons were drawn; and I would like to refrain from adding any further to it. We are now facing a new reality. It is encouraging to see that many former obstacles have been swept away. What is most important is the positive reality that has emerged from the tragedy of the war, resulting in a renewed role for the international community, not merely of a declaratory nature, to reaffirm legality against violence. We are faced now with an extraordinary opportunity to consolidate this yet fragile new dimension for the role of the international community. We should secure all its implications, as it not only represents the very foundation of the convention and of its future organization; but also because of the urgency, on a more general outlook, to provide credible and acceptable frameworks to ensure stability, while former strategic balances are breaking down.

Our debate on article IX is important in itself as well as for some of its implications of a more general nature. The Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, to whom I would like to convey the sympathy and appreciation of the Italian delegation, has therefore been right in devoting prior attention to the issue, against the backdrop of the ongoing events of the Gulf War aftermath. The problems yet to be solved on challenge inspection are basically turning around the critical question of striking the right balance between the protection of the legitimate interests of a State (security and confidentiality) and the need to consolidate the ever-increasing role of the international community through its organs, represented, in the specific case of article IX, by the executive council, the technical secretariat and by the inspection team.

In our view, it is possible to reach a compromise between these requirements, without undermining the prominence of the role of the future organization in fulfilling the main duties it has been entrusted by the convention. The availability of a neutral instrument above parties is useful to ensure and verify compliance but it also represents a guarantee against possible distortions of controls to the detriment of State parties' interests. It would not otherwise make sense to set up a new, costly and complex international organization if controls of the kind foreseen by article IX could be implemented through inter-State mechanisms, such as those existing in the INF, Stockholm and CFE agreements.

Allow me to cite some concrete examples, with regard to the role of the above-mentioned three organs, beginning with the director-general of the technical secretariat. He seems already implicitly empowered to check whether the elements of the request are assembled according to the basic procedural requirements listed in part III of the protocol on inspection procedures as annexed to document CD/CW/WP.352, as well as in the relevant section of the "rolling text". Upon notification, the requirement is in fact spelled out that the request should contain, inter alia, "the concern regarding compliance

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with the convention, including a specification of the relevant provision of the convention about which concerns have arisen, and the nature and circumstances of the suspected non-compliance", failing which one could envisage the return of the incomplete request to the challenging State, with an invitation to insert any missing elements. It would not be a substantive "filter", irreconcilable with the need for tight time-frames, but, rather, a procedural one, which the director-general of the technical secretariat would be called upon to fulfil through a formal evaluation of the admissibility of the request.

Furthermore, another element would seem relevant to the purpose of preventing negative consequences for the inspected State arising from requests not consistent with the scope of the convention: I am referring to the role of the inspection team and to the possibility that, during the conduct of the inspection, or even when drafting the inspection plan, a certain leeway and flexibility may be recognized in implementing the degree or the extension of the intrusiveness of the inspection, whenever it came across manifestly unfounded requests. In such circumstances it could even, in extreme situations, assume the responsibility of suspending or interrupting the inspection, thereby declaring it null and void. We therefore share the views of those who consider that the mandate should be flexible enough for the inspection team to tailor the inspection to the conditions they meet on the site.

The material conduct of the inspection can also provide us with some of the answers for the central dilemma of this system of verification, consisting in the search for the all too famous best balance between protection of confidentiality and the required intrusiveness of the controls. We are of the opinion that it may be possible to include more stringent provisions in the useful approach reflected by the four Western delegations, as far as inspections of undeclared sites are concerned, irrespective of the need to ensure in any case greater intrusiveness for the verification system of declared facilities.

We acknowledge the legitimate concerns of countries that, more than others, may find themselves potentially exposed and at a greater risk of disclosing national-security-related information not relevant to the convention. Concerns of such a nature, according to recent experience with national trial inspections (and as indicated also in the above-mentioned document), may be taken into account, in certain specific and sensitive circumstances, by giving exceptionally only individual inspectors access to certain parts of the inspection site, binding these inspectors with specific commitments about non-disclosure of unrelated confidential information. Furthermore, with regard to the need to secure the site in advance, in order to protect it from tampering of any kind, further thought should be given to the various possibilities of giving the inspection team discretion in checking incoming and outgoing traffic, by means of randomized controls, especially when inspecting large sites, or adopting some criteria in terms of quantitative thresholds (such as the tonnage of vehicles). We are of the view, in other words, that there is still further negotiating "room for manoeuvre" in order to reconcile positions and requirements which we believe will be less constraining in reality than in theory.

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Many delegations are also questioning the compatibility of the role of the observer, or his mere presence, with the neutral and super parties nature of the inspection team. We believe, like others, that the role of the observers should be a subsidiary one as opposed to the primary role of the team. But, at the same time, we are of the view that the observer could represent a useful instrument for the good conduct of the inspection, as he will be the conveyor of any information at the disposal of the requesting State that might be usefully disclosed to integrate the initial input by the latter. It would otherwise be difficult for a State party to entrust the organization with the task of verifying the well-foundedness of its own concern without feeling obliged at the same time and in its own interest to allow the organization to avail itself of all relevant information at the disposal of the State party itself.

I would at this stage also like to express a few considerations on the role of the executive council in the final stage of the challenge inspection. In the opinion of the Italian delegation, it should not be necessary to provide for an automatic convening at the end of the inspection, if only for practical and financial reasons, on the condition, however, that a single State be allowed to request such a meeting. Where the executive council is convened, two main procedural scenarios are set: in the first, an initial debate would take place on the substance of the final report, with no consequences in terms of possible recourse to measures to redress the situation. It would at that stage be simply a question of "reviewing" the situation and each member of the council, as well as each of the two concerned States, will be entitled to express its views on the conclusions of the report. It would not be necessary, at this juncture, to have any specific voting requirements by the executive council, as it would add nothing to a debate which would per se clearly indicate what the prevailing views are.

If, however, the executive council were to deem it necessary to have a follow-up to the review of the situation, in terms of promoting "any appropriate further action" - to quote the exact wording in the "rolling text" as well as in other relevant documents - in that case a decision by the executive council might prove necessary through recourse to the voting procedures agreed in the convention. We reserve the possibility of introducing a more precise textual proposal on this specific point.

In concluding on article IX, on which I have perhaps dwelt too extensively because of its symbolic character, I would state our readiness to agree on an inspection instrument that should be both effective and devoid of the possible arbitrary uses that some States, in good or bad faith, might make of it. An inspection system, in other words, entrusted to the superior responsibility of a multilateral and international organization going beyond the States themselves.

Consistently with such a general political approach, Italy is accurately assessing the possibility of carrying out a series of trial inspections, of multilateral and bilateral character, with countries belonging to the Mediterranean and middle eastern areas, which are particularly close to us and with which we share close ties of cooperation.

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Please allow me to briefly touch upon another specific but still important point. In our view, the possibility of the continued existence of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 beyond the entry into force of the convention could well be discussed, especially as a means to safeguard the international community from future withdrawal of States from the convention. However, the question of whether reservations to the Geneva Protocol should be allowed to continue to exist is a different issue and should be considered separately. Such reservations, on the entry into force of the convention, would no longer be compatible with the new version of article I, which provides for an unconditional prohibition of use. It would seem contradictory to allow a State to commit itself to such a new and far-reaching prohibition, while maintaining at the same time reservations safeguarding its right to retaliate "in kind".

Gaps to be filled up are always to be found, when a historical phase is over and a new one appears, charged with great promise but also with unknown factors, casting implications not always easily foreseeable. The stability of the world belonging to the recent past was, to say the least, the result of a negative factor: the fear of a nuclear holocaust in case of a military conflict of vast proportions with neither winners nor losers.

With the end of East-West confrontations, reliance on nuclear weapons is bound to face drastic reductions. This is Italy's persuasion and I am glad to associate myself with the worldwide appreciation for the signature of the START Treaty in Moscow, that we consider a first important step towards greater and more ambitious goals. Other positive forces are taking shape today, first and foremost those represented by public opinion and the consent of the people. We have seen in recent days the extent of their effectiveness. There is a need for such emerging consensus to rest on updated international structures, on a global or regional basis.

The convention on the total prohibition of chemical weapons contains a number of important innovations, to be connected with a growing role of the organs of the international community, above States parties. Other opportunities are ahead of us in the field of multilateral disarmament, and I would like to confirm that my country has trust in the future role of this negotiating body, worthy of being strengthened and updated at the appropriate time, in terms both of its composition and future competences. In the meanwhile it would be useful to devote the efforts we usually make to putting forward our own views also to the understanding of everyone else's positions. This could help us in avoiding unnecessary and time-consuming procedural wrestling. We are willing to cooperate in this direction, and we are confident in the success of our future endeavours.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Italy for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to me. I now call on the representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Ambassador Ri Tcheul.

Mr. RI (Democratic People's Republic of Korea) (translated from French): Allow me first of all, Mr. President, to congratulate you warmly on taking up the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament at this important stage and to wish you every success in your responsible task. This session of the Conference on Disarmament is about to complete its work in a very different climate from those that preceded it in recent years. Internationally, where tensions are diminishing and confrontation is giving way to reconciliation and cooperation, the peoples of the world no longer wish to return to the cold war, but ardently desire real disarmament being brought about as quickly as possible in order to maintain security and lasting peace. Most particularly, having witnessed the development of the situation that arose before and during the Gulf war, which took place under the threat of the use of nuclear and chemical weapons, they aspire to seeing the day come soon when our planet will be free for ever from power politics and sophisticated war matériel, which have caused immeasurable misfortune and suffering to a great many innocent inhabitants of that region.

In order to establish lasting peace and security around the world and to bring about development, there must be an end to the source of the factor of disturbance. At the present stage disarmament or arms control is not for most developing countries an immediate priority because they do not have an immense quantity of weapons to reduce, nor are they able to take part in the arms race, as the great Powers are. However, international relations today oblige them to attach great importance to disarmament. This is because comprehensive and global disarmament is vital for them, given the history of colonization by armed forces, the two major world wars that covered the globe, several hundreds of clashes and violent postwar conflicts - here I would like to stress that almost 170 armed conflicts, large and small, which have followed more than four decades of the postwar period, have broken out, all of them in the developing countries - and the current state of affairs under the permanent threat of nuclear weapons. The latter do not need the circumstances in which they will be obliged to spend considerable sums on importing weapons from the developed countries, but a climate of peace in which they can devote those sums to economic recovery. In other words, they need relations of international cooperation for their prosperity, but not a military threat from which they must suffer directly or indirectly. In short, this is tantamount to saying that it is incumbent upon the developed countries in general and the nuclear-weapon States in particular, beginning with the super-Powers, to be in a position, indeed to have the duty, to establish in the sphere of disarmament such an international climate of peace for humanity. With this in view, we welcome the agreement on the complete destruction of chemical weapons arrived at by the Americano-Soviet super-Powers, and the signing of the Treaty on intermediate nuclear forces and the START Treaty, and we also appreciate the signing of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. As everyone is aware, such occurrences did not come about because of the talent of a few individuals, but were the result of a policy following the political will of the authorities. Consequently, we are persuaded that it is only when not only their political promise, whether in the case of a treaty, a convention or an agreement, has been implemented as quickly as possible, but also when it has been extended to a great many other sectors and regions, that the multilateral negotiations on disarmament will easily attain their final objective.

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What is currently threatening the existence of humanity itself is, first and foremost, an enormous quantity of nuclear weapons deployed in different parts of the globe. The reduction and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in all their forms, a ban on nuclear testing to prevent qualitative enhancement, and their complete abolition, constitutes the unanimous demand of the peoples of the world. Although a number of positive initiatives and measures have been adopted to reduce nuclear weapons, problems here and there still arise which prompt a great deal of concern on the part of humanity. Since this is just a beginning, as long as new nuclear tests continue in order to improve the quality of these weapons, which offsets and goes far beyond the cuts, and as long as the changes to promote the dismantling of nuclear weapons on foreign soil have no practical effect. We hope that on the basis of their international obligations to dispel the disquiet of the peoples of the world, the nuclear super-Powers will adopt measures to bring about the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from the region most threatened by nuclear war, first and foremost, so that their promise can be fulfilled constantly.

It is very well known that it is the Korean peninsula which is the most dangerous region where a nuclear war could break out in the aftermath of the Gulf war. The survival of the Korean people has been threatened for more than 30 years by 1,000 nuclear weapons deployed in the southern part of the Korean peninsula. These nuclear weapons not only seriously threaten peace and security in Korea, but also exacerbate the regional situation to the utmost. No country in Asia will believe that the nuclear weapons in South Korea would remain targeted on the North or that they would not one day be pointed towards themselves. These nuclear weapons were deployed, we are told, by one of the main nuclear-weapon countries during the cold war period when they considered the Korean peninsula as their theatre of operations for a nuclear showdown, as a means of dissuasion. That having been said, nothing can justify the presence of a great number of nuclear weapons in South Korea, in the context of a shift from confrontation to cooperation and the conclusion of agreements on the reduction of nuclear weapons.

Against this background, the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, on 30 July last, submitted a new proposal for converting the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-weapon-free zone. The text of the proposal was distributed as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament (CD/1096), the main thrust of which is as follows. The north and south of Korea shall agree on the establishment of a nuclear-free zone on the Korean peninsula and make a joint statement thereof. They should negotiate the matters concerned and adopt a joint declaration with legal effect not later than the end of 1992 providing in particular for a ban on the testing, manufacture and possession of nuclear weapons by north and south, the prohibition of the deployment and passage of such weapons and related military exercises in the sphere of the nuclear-free zone, and verification of the absence of nuclear weapons through inspections of the north and south.

The United States, and the Soviet Union and China, the nuclear-weapon States neighbouring on the Korean peninsula, shall legally guarantee the nuclear-free status of the Korean peninsula, once an agreement is reached and this region is proclaimed a nuclear-weapon-free zone. Within one year after

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the north and south of Korea jointly declare the establishment of a nuclear-free zone, the nuclear-weapon States should remove all factors contravening the nuclear-free status and give assurances that they will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons. In particular, measures should be taken to withdraw American nuclear weapons from South Korea. Asian non-nuclear-weapon States shall support the conversion of the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-weapon-free zone and respect its status.

Our new proposal took into consideration the position recently adopted by the United States whereby they would not object in principle to the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone, provided that the parties involved agreed on this point, and the support they have shown for the establishment of such zones in the Middle East, in South Asia and in Africa. The United States Department of State issued a declaration that was not negative, I would even say positive, towards our proposal, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of South Korea, through a spokesman, alluded to his consent, albeit conditional, to discussion of our proposal.

My Government is ready to undertake negotiations with the south Korean side at any time and at any level, and the same applies to the United States. It is convinced that once negotiations have begun, a happy future will open up as regards the conversion of the Korean peninsula into a non-nuclear zone. It would harm no one but would benefit everyone. Given that our proposal provides for realistic and practical measures, the denuclearization of the peninsula, if the authorities of South Korea and the United States truly desire it, will be attained in very short order. If the Korean peninsula is made into a nuclear-weapon-free zone, the source of any nuclear war will be eliminated, and this will create conditions conducive to consolidating peace and security in Korea and in Asia and the peaceful reunification of Korea.

For more than 10 years the Conference on Disarmament has engaged in an effort to eliminate chemical weapons, one of the weapons of mass destruction, from the Earth once and for all. It has taken various steps, particularly this year, to draw the attention of many countries to the importance of the issue of chemical weapons, while intensifying negotiations for the preparation of the convention. As a result of these endeavours, we have seen some successes: the number of participants in the session of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons has risen among non-member States; a breach has opened in the negotiations and agreement has been reached on many provisions. This gives hope for the adoption of the convention by the end of 1992 at the latest. We feel that problems such as the verification system, the executive council and others can be resolved if the negotiations are directed towards taking sufficient account of the concern of non-chemical-weapon countries, particularly developing countries. Clear experience has also been acquired this year to enhance the effectiveness of the Conference on Disarmament. This is, we may say, a forum for the adoption of general disarmament measures to ensure peace and security throughout the world. For that reason participation in the Conference on Disarmament should be enhanced on a large scale, so that the problems of the widest possible variety of regions and categories are fully reflected and dealt with. We consider that the number of member States should be increased and in the immediate future the participation of non-member

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States in the Conference made much easier. In this regard my delegation would like to propose that we consider changing the procedure so that, if non-member States submit an application to participate in sessions of the Conference on Disarmament, their participation can be renewed by tacit agreement every year unless any objection is raised.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for his statement and the kind words addressed to the Chair. I now call on the representative of India, Ambassador Shah, who will introduce the report distributed this morning with symbol CD/1106.

Mr. SHAH (India): Before I present the report, Mr. President, let me join you and other previous speakers in welcoming Ambassador Celso Amorim of Brazil amongst us. I wish him success in his endeavours here and extend the full cooperation of my delegation to him.

I have taken the floor to present the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban which is on the table today as document CD/1106. Having presided over the Ad Hoc Committee only during its last stage of the final consideration and adoption of its report to the Conference, my task has been easy. The harder work had already been accomplished over the year by my predecessor, Ambassador Chadha. Even before the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee this year, there were many questions as to what the Ad Hoc Committee would be doing and how it would go about its work. The fact that its work has gone smoothly and it was conducted in a cordial and constructive atmosphere owes much to the excellent cooperation all delegations extended to my delegation throughout the year.

Before his departure, at a plenary meeting on 25 July, Ambassador Chadha gave his impressions of the work of the Ad Hoc Committee. I should like to refer delegations to that statement again. A spirit of compromise was manifest during the organization of the work and the quality of the debates on the three clusters of questions which the Ad Hoc Committee had assigned itself, namely general debate, structure and scope and verification and compliance was indeed high.

I should like to emphasize that the report in front of you today represents a serious and considered, and at times highly technical, exchange of views held this year. The goal was to lay the groundwork for eventual negotiations on a nuclear test ban. The goal, I believe, has been largely achieved. The report deals with substantive issues. It touches on the main questions relating to the achievement of a nuclear test ban. As we are all aware, nuclear testing is not only a technical issue, but also a highly political issue connected directly to the defence and security concerns of States. In a rapidly changing world, a phrase which tended in the past to be a cliché, but now has taken on new significance, it is even more imperative that the security concerns of all sides must be respected. I believe the report presents in a balanced manner the genuine differences of perception of security needs that continue to exist with relation to a nuclear test ban.

(Mr. Shah, India)

Bearing those differences in mind, the Ad Hoc Committee accomplished an important task: the international community represented here in this negotiating forum has kept the question on its agenda, in the context of a subsidiary organ, exploring the areas of agreement and disagreement and preparing for future work. An important contribution to future work on the item was made in the agreement reached by the Ad Hoc Committee to recommend that it be re-established at the beginning of its 1992 session. I definitely endorse this recommendation.

Allow me to express my appreciation to the delegations participating in the work of the Committee this year. Allow me also on behalf of Ambassador Chadha and my delegation to express a special note of thanks to all ambassadors who took a special interest in the deliberations and in particular the group coordinators: Mr. José Felicio of Brazil, Mr. Max Gevers of the Netherlands and Mr. Vladimir Gaspar of Czechoslovakia. I also thank Mr. Zhang of China for his contribution. It would be remiss of me not to mention the excellent support my delegation received from Mr. Cassandra and Mrs. Cummins from the secretariat. Both of them worked extremely hard for the sake of the successful conduct of the Ad Hoc Committee's work. Finally, may I, on behalf of the Ad Hoc Committee, thank all the interpreters responsible among others for the efficient translation of complicated terminology which contributed to the smooth conduct of our meetings this year?

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of India for introducing the report that appears in document CD/1106. I should also like to sincerely congratulate the delegation of India, responsible for the chairmanship, on the conclusion of the work of that subsidiary body. I now call on the distinguished representative of Argentina, Mr. Grossi, who, on behalf of the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, will introduce the report of that Committee, which is contained in document CD/1105.

Mr. GROSSI (Argentina) (translated from Spanish): Allow me at the outset to extend the most cordial welcome on behalf of my Ambassador and my delegation to the ambassadors of India, Prakash Shah, Egypt, Mounir Zahran, and Brazil, Celso Amorim, who are joining this Conference at an especially important time in its negotiations. We are certain that their presence will give impetus and creativity to this multilateral negotiating body on disarmament. As of now we pledge our firmest support and cooperation in our joint efforts.

On behalf of the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on item 5 of the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament, Ambassador Roberto García Moritán, I have the signal honour this morning to put before the Conference for its consideration the report of the Ad Hoc Committee entrusted with the consideration of item 5 on the agenda of our organ, Prevention of an arms race in outer space, contained in document CD/1105. In so doing my delegation would briefly like to stress some aspects related to the report we are introducing today. These pertain to the task we have been accomplishing during this session in the exercise of the chairmanship of this subsidiary body. Firstly, we believe that the report we are introducing this morning

(Mr. Grossi, Argentina)

contains certain elements enabling us to assert that the Committee has worked hard in an attempt to find areas of consensus in a field which is not always easy. A reading of the report will indicate that the members of the Committee considered it appropriate this year to adopt a more dynamic and practical methodology which would enable them to tackle the items before the Committee in a more detailed manner. The Chair thus drew up a series of lists of topics, for the purpose of bringing some order into the debate and also to single out those issues which incontestably enjoy the attention of delegations, leaving aside those which do not seem to awaken such interest. The lists have been annexed to the report and might perhaps serve to guide future debates within this Committee.

For the first time since its establishment in 1985, the Committee made use of the device of friends of the Chair, in order to tackle three specific subjects. Respectively, these were important terminological issues for the prevention of an arms race in outer space, aspects connected with verification of anti-satellite weapons, and confidence-building measures, including improvements in the existing and future databases in the space field. On behalf of the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, I should like most especially to express my gratitude for the valuable cooperation extended in their capacity as friends of the Chair by Mr. Anthony Monckton of the delegation of the United Kingdom, Mr. Mahmoud Karem of the delegation of Egypt and Mr. Mikhail Antyukhin of the delegation of the Soviet Union, who coordinated the consultations related to the three items indicated in the order I mentioned. The results of their efforts can be consulted by delegations in the shape of the working documents which will contain their respective reports. The work of the group coordinators, Mr. Christer Elm of the delegation of Sweden for the Group of 21, Mr. Marc Finaud of the delegation of France for the Western Group and Mr. Plamen Grozdanov of Bulgaria and Mr. Mikhail Antyukhin of the Soviet Union for the Group of East European and other States, as well as the distinguished delegate of China to the Committee, Mr. Zhan Yang, also deserve all our thanks. We also most warmly thank the Secretary of the Committee, Mr. Vladimir Bogomolov.

The prevention of an arms race in outer space is a subject of crucial importance for the security of all States, whether space Powers or not. The Ad Hoc Committee which this Conference on Disarmament established six years ago for the first time reflects that interest and attempts to make progress in conformity with its programme of work towards the definition of areas of convergence. We hope that the work that we have done this year has contributed to that lofty goal.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Argentina for his statement. I would be grateful if you would convey to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee our most sincere congratulations on the conclusion of the tasks assigned to that subsidiary body. I now call on the representative of the Republic of Korea, Mr. Moon.

Mr. MOON (Republic of Korea): Mr. President, as it is for the first time that my delegation takes the floor under your presidency, I wish, on behalf of my delegation, to extend to you our warm congratulations on your assumption

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of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament. My delegation is confident that, under your able and experienced guidance, the 1991 session of the Conference on Disarmament will achieve a substantial and successful conclusion.

My delegation wishes to just briefly touch upon the nuclear question on the Korean peninsula. It is well known that the conclusion of the safeguards agreement with the IAEA as a commitment to the implementation of non-proliferation has promoted confidence-building among the States parties and facilitated adherence to the NPT by other non-parties, thus strengthening the effectiveness and universality of the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

As was already mentioned in my delegation's earlier statement of 27 June, the unsafeguarded nuclear facilities of the States parties to the NPT, particularly the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, reportedly possessing significant nuclear facilities, have been the subject of international concern. This concern has been expressed without ambiguity by a number of countries in the meetings of the IAEA Board of Governors and other international forums such as the NPT Review Conference. My delegation wishes to stress that the concern expressed in one way or another is not the view of a single country but the collective concern of the world community.

As a result of the concerted efforts of the international community, we are now witnessing a step forward with regard to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's conclusion of a safeguards agreement with the IAEA. At the meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors in June, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea agreed with the draft safeguards agreement proposed by the IAEA, with a view to submitting the draft agreement to the IAEA Board of Governors for approval at its September session.

While welcoming such a development, my delegation cannot but express our particular concern that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea still attaches extraneous elements to the conclusion of the safeguards agreement as well as to the implementation. We all know that to bring extraneous elements to the NPT system is contradictory to the obligations incurred by member countries under the NPT.

The earliest and speediest conclusion of the safeguards agreement with the IAEA is the only way to put an end to the lingering suspicions and misgivings of the world community. My delegation believes that a move in this direction will contribute not only to strengthening of the universal application of the NPT regime, but also to removing obstacles standing in the way of inter-Korean confidence-building and the reconciliation process.

Now my delegation cannot but refer to the North Korean proposal, that is, the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone on the Korean peninsula. Since the proposal on the establishment of such a zone was launched by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in the late 1970s, the proposal has not received much support from the international community. The proposal, being ideal in its concept, but unrealistic in its implication, has been advanced

(Mr. Moon, Republic of Korea)

without taking into account the regional politico-military situation as well as the views of other States in the region, which is a fundamental prerequisite for the proposal coming under this category.

In this regard, we wish to recall again that the Final Document of the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament as well as the Final Declaration of the third NPT review conference stated, *inter alia*, that the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone should be based on arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned and should also take into account the characteristics of the region. The proposal of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea therefore falls far short of the internationally recognized standards on the establishment of such a zone.

With regard to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's recent proposal concerning the establishment of such a zone on the Korean peninsula as made in its Foreign Ministry's statement of 30 July, my delegation wishes to reiterate my Government's position by quoting the statement by the Republic of Korea's Foreign Ministry's spokesman on 1 August.

"Firstly, the Korean Government takes note that North Korea's proposal concerning the establishment of a nuclear-free zone on the Korean peninsula as made in its Foreign Ministry's statement of 30 July 1991 contains some new details compared with its previous proposals.

"Secondly, the Korean Government wishes to make it clear that as a signatory to the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty, North Korea should accept full-scope IAEA inspection on all nuclear-related material and facilities on its soil, including the reprocessing facilities. The fulfilment of this obligation cannot be linked with any other issues.

"Thirdly, after having made this clear, the Korean Government considers that, for the purpose of reducing tension and building confidence on the Korean peninsula, military and other matters including nuclear non-proliferation can be discussed between the South-North Korean authorities in the future."

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of the Republic of Korea for his statement and the kind words addressed to the Chair. There are no more speakers on the list. Would any other delegation like to take the floor? I call on the representative of Brazil, Ambassador Celso Nunes Amorim.

Mr. AMORIM (Brazil): Mr. President, I will be very brief, but I want to thank you very much for the kind words you addressed to me. It is an honour and a pleasure for me to be welcomed at the Conference on Disarmament by a representative of a Latin-American country, a neighbouring country of Brazil with which we enjoy special relations. You have been appointed President of this Conference at a very important moment of finalizing the report to the

(Mr. Amorim, Brazil)

General Assembly, and I trust that your able guidance will, as it has already, bring us to our desired results of informing the United Nations of the fruitful work of the Conference in the 1991 session.

Let me also thank all the colleagues present in this session for the warm welcome I received, and most specially Ambassador Shah of India and my colleague from Argentina. In response to your friendship I offer the full cooperation and the constructive participation of my delegation in the activities of the Conference. It is a great honour for me to attend the sessions of the Conference in this Council chamber at such an important moment for the fulfilment of its tasks. It will be a heavy responsibility for me to discharge the functions which in the past were carried out by many prominent representatives of Brazilian diplomacy. It is my strong wish to continue their work in such a way that my country can further contribute to the cause of international security and disarmament. To accomplish my tasks, I rely on the most valuable help offered to me by the distinguished delegates to the Conference, and by yourself, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Brazil for his statement and the kind words addressed to the Chair. I shall now very briefly call on the representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

Mr. HAN (Democratic People's Republic of Korea): I will be very brief. With regard to the question of Korea there are a lot of things to say, politically, militarily, historically, but this should be discussed between the countrymen from North and South - we could solve these problems. This is not the forum to mention and discuss those things. Therefore I refrain from saying all the details. But I would like to emphasize one thing clearly, that the real threat of nuclear war is not from the North, but from the long-standing side, from the South. This is well known. I would like to emphasize once again that my Government has not the willingness to produce nuclear weapons and we have no big capabilities to do so and we do not have the necessity to produce and to have those awful weapons on Korean territory. I made it clear. We have the constant policy to conclude and to implement our international obligations under the NPT, so we have negotiations though we have some difficulties in the real situations. We have negotiations; progress we have made, and we will fulfil. When some persons are talking loudly about these questions as a new danger in Korea, this is something else to cover the real threat. Therefore we ask them to stop such manipulations in the future.

With regard to our proposals for a nuclear-free zone on the Korean peninsula, this is derived from the anxiousness and strong aspirations of the Korean people to escape from the nuclear threat and nuclear disaster which presently prevails on the Korean peninsula. This is not a trick, this is not a kind of game, nobody can play with such serious problems. This proposal has been broadly supported by various circles of the international community, not only the Governments but also many social circles - I would like to make it clear - as well as this endeavour of our Government should be fulfilled with the support of the international community. When we proposed these new proposals the Governments of the Soviet Union and China immediately supported

(Mr. Han, Democratic People's Republic of Korea)

them and a positive reaction was shown for the first time by the Government of the United States. Therefore, this fact shows that the Korean peninsula is a place where the world community is drawing deep attention and should be solved as soon as possible.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I suggest we move to other matters. As I mentioned before, I will now invite the Conference to adopt the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-nuclear-weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, which was circulated last week in document CD/1104. If there are no objections I shall take it the report is adopted.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): In connection with the two reports introduced today, I propose to put them before the Conference for adoption during the plenary meeting of 4 September next.

Before proceeding to examine the calendar of meetings for next week, I would like to report to you on the status of the annual report to the United Nations General Assembly. The open-ended informal consultations on agenda items 2, 3, 7 and 8 have been concluded successfully. The secretariat is preparing the revision of the working papers in all official languages. It is hoped that the texts in English will be ready tomorrow, Friday afternoon and at the latest on Monday afternoon in the other official languages.

The subsidiary bodies have concluded their work and their reports are being prepared in all the official languages. The report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons will be ready later than the others, as this Committee concluded its work at the eleventh hour on Tuesday. The English text will be available on Tuesday the 3rd in the morning and the remaining languages first thing on Wednesday the 4th. Owing to the size of the report and the fact that the Committee was not able to conclude its work last Monday as planned, it has not been possible to have it available earlier.

As I announced today, we shall be considering in an informal meeting this morning immediately following the plenary the technical parts of the report appearing in documents CD/WP.409 and 411. I hope that these will not prompt any difficulties. In any event, it is obvious that as the necessary documents are circulated delegations will need time to consider them. Hence it seems desirable that the second and last reading of the draft annual report should take place in an informal meeting on Wednesday, 4 September, before the adoption of the report in plenary. This has also been our approach in years past when this was necessary. So for the meetings on the 4th, we shall have the following documentation: documents CD/WP.409 and 411, relating to the technical parts of the report, along with an addendum if any amendments prove necessary, and revision 1 of the four documents already circulated on the substantive paragraphs relating to agenda items 2, 3, 7 and 8. The new documents will be distributed in delegations' pigeon-holes as they come out.

(The President)

The timetable for next week circulated today by the secretariat takes into account the observations I made on the annual report. Also, in accordance with the understanding arrived at in the President's consultations with the coordinators, to which I referred at the last plenary meeting, the services assigned to subsidiary bodies that have concluded their work have been put at the disposal of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. I suggest then that we adopt the timetable.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I should now like to inform you of a change regarding the meeting scheduled for 3 p.m. this afternoon in room V. According to the timetable for this week, that meeting was to be a meeting of Group B of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. It has now been decided that, instead of that group, it will be Group C that will hold a meeting on that occasion.

I have no further business, and shall therefore proceed to adjourn this plenary meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Wednesday, 4 September, immediately following the informal meeting devoted to the consideration of the draft annual report.

The meeting rose at 11.30 a.m.